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RECENT BOOKS
This department undertakes to note or review briefly current books on law and mate-

rials closely related thereto. Periodicals, court reports, and other publications that appear
at frequent intervals are not included. The information given in the notes is derived from
inspection of the books, publishers' literature, and the ordinary library sources.

BRIEF REVIEWS
Rm.ATIONS

BETWEEN THE

FEDERAL .AND STATE CoURTS.

By Mitchell Wendell.

Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, edited by the Faculty of
Political Science of Columbia University, No. 555. New York: Columbia
University Press. 1949. Pp. 298. $4.
Twelve years have elapsed since the Supreme Court of the United States, in
two swift strokes, reversed the relationship of the federal and state judiciaries with
respect to both substantive and procedural law. The new Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,1 displacing and superseding the 56-year-old Conformity Act,2 were submitted by Chief Justice Hughes to Attorney-General Cummings on December 20,
1937, and became law the following September 16, three months after adjournment of Congress on June 16, 1938. On April 25 of that same year, the Court's
decision in Erie Railroad Co. 11. Tompkins3 struck down the 96-year-old doctrine
of Swift 11. Tyson, 4 whereunder federal courts were free to disregard_state precedents and apply their own interpretation of state law. Thus, almost in a breath,
procedural conformity gave way to procedural independence, and substantive
independence to substantive conformity.
The torrent of legal writing which these two epoch-making changes in federal
judicial policy set off is not yet fully abated, 5 but a reappraisal of the judicial phase
of American federalism after a decade of the new order is now possible, and such
is the purpose of this book.
Mr. Wendell begins with the establishment and rise to power of the federal
Judiciary, traces the development and current trends of the two most important
bases of federal jurisdiction (federal question and diversity of citizenship) and
concludes with certain recommendations for improvement of federal-state judicial
relationships. He decides, and most lawyers will agree, that it would not be practical for a single judicial system, either federal or state, to do justice to the administration of two systems of law, and that as long as a federal government is maintained there will be a need for both federal and state courts. The chief problems
that arise out of that duality have to do with access of litigants to federal courts
and the distribution of judicial power between the two systems. Areas of possible
conflict occur whenever under a given set of facts and law there is a choice of
1

308 U.S. 645 (1939), authorized by Act of June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, c. 651.
17 Stat. 197 (1872).
a 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938).
416 Pet. (41 U.S.) 1 (1842).
5 In 1939 the section on federal courts of the Index to Legal Periodicals contained 53
references on these two subjects; in 1941, 41; and in 1949 about a dozen.
2
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tribunals, or when the tribunal having jurisdiction has a choice of laws to apply.
The author would narrow the former by limiting diversity jurisdiction to cases in
which a showing of risk of local prejudice could be made. The latter has been
largely resolved by the Tompkins case, although the difficulties of the federal
courts in ascertaining what the state law is are graphically portrayed.
About half of the book is taken up with the Tyson and Tompkins cases and
their background and implications. Gelpcke v. Dubuque,6 a ''high water mark"
of federal judicial independence under Swi~ v. Tyson, is pictured against an
interesting and illuminating background of the story of nineteenth-century railroad
financing and the municipal bond litigation that arose out of it.
The most anomalous feature of present federal-state judicial relationships is
the extreme to which the doctrine of federal supremacy has been pushed in the
granting of concurrent jurisdiction to state courts to enforce acts of Congress, and
it is surprising that the author makes no more of it than he does. Article VI
of the Federal Constitution makes that Constitution and federal laws and
treaties the supreme law of the land, and particularly specifies that "the judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any
State to the contrary notwithstanding." There is no reason to suppose that the
writers of the Constitution had anything more in mind than, in Mr. Wendell's
words, "a necessary safeguard against the undercutting of the central government"
to "prevent state nullification of national policies." To a simple sharing of jurisdiction, as in naturalization cases, however, has been added the compulsory state
jurisdiction of the Federal Employers' Liability Act,7 with removals forbidden,
and an apparent acquiescence by the Supreme Court in the proposition that in such
an instance state courts may not decline jurisdiction for an otherwise valid reason
such as forum non conveniens.8 For a hundred years states have declined to
enforce "penal" laws of the United States, but in a 1946 case the Supreme Court
denounced that stand, and asserted that it "flies in the face of the fact that the
States of the Union constitute a nation." 9 The federal courts have recent).y gone
so far as not only to tell the state courts what cases to try but how to handle them.10
61 Wall. (68 U.S.) 175 (1864).
7 36 Stat. 291, §6, 45 U.S.C.A. (1910) §§51-60.
8 Leet v. Union Pacific R. Co., 25 Cal. (2d) 605 at 612-613, 155 P. (2d) 42 (1944)
cert. den. 325 U.S. 866, 65 S.Ct. 1403 (1945). A contrary view was stated by Mr. Justice
Holmes in Douglas v. N.Y., N.H. and H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377 at 387, 49 S.Ct. 355 (1928):
"As to the grant of jurisdiction in the Employers' Liability Act, that statute does not purport
to require State Courts to entertain suits arising under it, but only to empower them to do so,
so far as the authority of the United States is concerned." This has been overlooked or
ignored in much subsequent litigation; it is not even cited in Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386,
67 S.Ct. 810 (1947).
o Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 at 389, 67 S.Ct. 810 (1947).
10 In Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 70 S.Ct. 105 (1949), the
Georgia court had sustained a demurrer to a complaint fil1:d under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, in reliance upon a long-standing Georgia rule of practice that pleadings are to
be construed most unfavorably to the pleader. The Supreme Court (Black, J.) did not like
the rule and its application, and reversed with a holding that a valid cause of action was
stated. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson dissented, on grounds that the decision did violence
to the existing system of judicial federalism.
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Mr. Wendell accepts this situation as settled and goes on to discuss some questions of policy that arise out of it, such as the financial burden on the state judicial
systems, but decides that whatever danger there may be lies 'in the future rather
than the present. It has already gone so far, however, that unless the Supreme
Court sometime takes the trouble to make a specific examination of the problem
and chalk out some frontiers beyond which federal domination of the state judiciaries may not be pressed, drastic changes in our conception of federal and state
sovereignty will have to be made.

Glenn R. Winters*

* Secretary-Treasurer, American Judicature Society; Editor, Journal of the American
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